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The Position of National Minorities in Putin’s Russia:  
 
Uniformity or Diversity? 
 
 
Dr. Federica Prina 
 
 
 
With the prominence of Putin as the ‘face of Russia’ on our television screens, and an internal and 
foreign policy characterised by a vigorous promotion of Russian patriotism and sovereignty, one may 
well forget the remarkable ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity of the Russian Federation.  
 
Russia has a long tradition of multi-ethnicity. The vastness of the lands that comprised the Russian 
Empire and Soviet Union – reduced but still considerable in contemporary Russia – have resulted in 
an age-old intermingling of peoples. This diversity encompasses a multitude of Slavic, but also Finno-
Ugric, Turkic and Asiatic peoples.
1
 In the 2010 census as many as 193 groups and subgroups were 
listed, with nearly one fifth of the population identifying with groups other than the ethnic Russian 
majority.
2
 Variations in ethnic background reflect a myriad of languages spoken across the territory 
of modern Russia, as well as high levels of religious diversity: four religions are considered traditional 
to Russia - Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism.
3
 While Russia’s substantial Muslim 
population
4
 came to international attention during the Chechen wars, in most cases religious 
                                                           
1
 This include 46 indigenous peoples, the so-called ‘indigenous people of the North, Siberia and Far East’. 
2
 Census data can be found at: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm 
3
 The preamble of Law ‘On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations’ (No. 125-FZ, 26 September 
1997) refers to the four religions as ‘an inalienable part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia’. 
4
 According to the Pew Forum, Muslims in Russia were projected to increase from approximately 16.4 million 
(2010) to 18.6 million (2030), and their share of the population from 11.7% (2010) to 14.4% (2030). See  
  
4 
minorities have lived peacefully alongside those who affiliate to the Russian Orthodox Church. In a 
region such as the Republic of Tatarstan – one of the territorial units of the Russian Federation – 
Russian Orthodox churches and monasteries sit alongside mosques.
5
  
 
Such high levels of diversity, and a tradition of coexistence of disparate ethnic groups, does not 
mean the absence of Russo-centric approaches to Russia’s history, with the rejection, by some, of 
Russia’s pluri-ethnic character. For example, a 2013 Levada Center survey showed that 30% of ethnic 
Russians had feelings of dislike vis-à-vis persons from Russia’s Southern republics residing in their 
cities; 25% felt anger and 6% fear.
6
 Ultra-right movements have engendered instances of hate crime: 
according to preliminary data by the Sova Centre, in the first half of 2015, 37 persons suffered 
injuries as a result of ethnically-motivated hate crime, and four of them died.
7
 A 2006 report by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism referred to instances of discrimination 
and harassment, affecting principally non-Slavic, darker-skinned groups, such as persons from 
Central Asia and the Caucasus.
8
 At the same time, the official (Putin’s) position is one that 
ostentatiously supports a vision of a Russia that is multi-ethnic and multi-faith – yet existing 
practices promote homogenisation and uniformity across the various segments of Russian society. 
  
ETHNIC MOBILISATION AFTER THE DEMISE OF THE SOVIET UNION 
 
The question of how to deal with the ethnic mosaic of the former Russian Empire was one that had 
to be incorporated already into Soviet planning.
9
 The objective of peaceful inter-ethnic relations had 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe/#russia   
5
 Over half (53.2%) of the republic’s population identified in the 2010 census as Tatars, who traditionally are 
affiliated to the Muslim faith.   
6
 See Levada Center, “Rossiyane o Migratsii i Mezhnatsional’noi Napryazhennosti” [Russians on Migrations and 
Inter-ethnic Tensions], 5 December 2013, at: 
http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti  
7
 Sova Center for Information and Analysis, “Pro-Kremlin and Oppositional – with the Shield and on It: 
Xenophobia, Radical Nationalism and Efforts to Counteract them in Russia during the First Half of 2015”, 31 
August 2015, at: http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2015/08/d32675/  
8 
Report by the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Intolerance, Doudou Diène, “Mission to the Russian Federation”, A/HRC/4/19/Add.3, 20 May 2007. 
9
 See for example Lenin, V.I. “Critical Remarks on the National Question”, in: Lenin Collected Works (Moscow: 
Progress, 1972 [1913]), 17–51; Stalin, J. Marksizm i Natsional’nyi Vopros [Maxism and the National Question] 
(Moscow: State Political Literature Publishing, 1950 [1913]). 
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to be combined with the spreading of Communist ideas among the population, including groups with 
little or no knowledge of the Russian language. Thus, diversity was acknowledged as a fact, 
institutionalised and thus embedded in Soviet policies. One of the most significant steps in this 
direction was the subdivision of Soviet territory so as to ‘assign’ some regions to the largest ethnic 
groups, which became known as ‘titular nationalities’. This form of ethnic federalism involved a 
hierarchy of territorial entities, starting with Union Republics (e.g. the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic), to autonomous republics,
10
 down to smaller units. These entities could easily be perceived 
as quasi-nation states by the titular groups - and indeed, newly-independent states (particularly the 
Baltic states) strove towards the nation-state model in the post-Soviet period.  
 
If, with the end of the Soviet Union, former Union Republics became newly-independent states, 
there was also an upsurge of ethnic mobilisation within the former Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Territorial units declared their sovereignty en masse in the period 1990-
1992, in what became known as the ‘parade of sovereignties’.
11
 Chechnya famously attempted 
secession, yet remained within the Russian Federation. Tatarstan negotiated a power-sharing treaty 
with Moscow,
12
 and succeeded in preserving amicable relations with the federal centre. Ultimately a 
form of internal balance was reached, with a range of bilateral agreements between the federal 
authorities and the leaders of (ethnic and non-ethnic) regions. At the same time, ethnic mobilisation 
in the early post-Soviet period, and concerns over territorial claims (aggravated by the crisis in 
Chechnya), led to a generalised recognition of the ‘excessive’ focus on territory that had 
characterised ethnic federalism. In light of this, a Law on National Cultural Autonomy (NCA) was 
adopted in 1996,
13
 with the objective of providing persons belonging to nationalities other than the 
Russian majority with a degree of autonomy in the promotion of their cultures and languages, 
regardless of territorial formations. Such non-territorial arrangements would serve a complementary 
function to the existing ethnic federal structure, while diminishing the emphasis on territory. This 
would, it was hoped, contain territorial claims and inter-ethnic tensions more generally. In 2000 the 
Russian government noted, with reference to NCA:  ‘this practical form of self-determination and 
                                                           
10
 Such as the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR). 
11
 Hale, H.E. “The Parade of Sovereignty: Testing Theories of Secession in the Soviet Setting”, British Journal of 
Political Science, 30(1) (2000), 31–56. 
12
 Signed in 1994.  
13
 Law ‘On National Cultural Autonomy’,  No. 74-FZ, 17 June 1996. 
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realization of the rights of national minorities is of special importance for those ethnoses that do not 
enjoy territorial autonomy in view of their geographical dispersion.’
14
 
Ethnic republics
15
 remain regions in which titular nationalities enjoy particular privileges: republics 
can declare regional (titular) languages co-official with Russian, and their schools teach in, or 
through the medium of, these languages (albeit to varying degrees
16
). These measures suggest a 
general attention to diversity which precedes Putin and has, to some extent, continued under his 
leadership. At the same time, Putin has advanced a movement towards uniformity which 
encompasses both territorial and non-territorial arrangements for the management of ethnic 
diversity.  
 
RECENTRALISATION UNDER PUTIN 
 
The Putin leadership has strongly promoted a process of re-centralisation, by reducing the autonomy 
of the regions, including the ethnic republics. The regions had distanced themselves from the federal 
centre under Yeltsin, when the loosening of the centre-periphery connections had gone so far as to 
generate concerns over a possible disintegration of the Russian Federation.
17
 Putin’s reforms in this 
area have been wide-ranging, including: reconfirming the primacy of federal legislation and 
institutions over regional ones; and a shift towards appointment of leaders of regions and localities, 
thereby increasing federal controls. In particular, some measures have disproportionately affected 
national minorities. Among these has been the partial alteration of the federal structure of the 
Federation, by which some ethnicity-based regions have been merged with predominantly Russian 
regions.
18
 Another set of measures that has advanced homogenisation is linked to a Federation-wide 
                                                           
14
 ACFC (Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities), First 
Report submitted by the Russian Federation, ACFC/SR(1999)015,  8 March 2000, at 12. 
15
 These are generally referred to as ‘ethnic republics’, although the 1993 Russian Constitution calls them 
simply ‘republics’. In 2014 Russia had 83 ‘subjects’ (territorial units), including 21 ethnic republics. The number 
rose to 85 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
16
 Depending on numbers of persons belonging to minorities, and the availability of resources. 
17
 Petrov, N., “Federalism”, in: M. McFaul, N. Petrov and A. Ryabov (eds.), Between Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2004), 213–238. 
18
 This process stalled in 2008 before it could expand to affect ethnic republics. 
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education reform, which has resulted in the overall decrease in the teaching of minority languages 
and cultures in the ethnic republics after a peak in the 1990s.
19
  
 
What about arrangements to promote the rights of national minorities outside the framework of 
ethnic federalism? The School of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Glasgow has been 
researching the forms of implementation of NCA legislation in Russia.
20
 Hundreds of national cultural 
autonomies (NCAs) have been established at the local, regional and federal levels since 1996; 
despite this, the NCA system has been repeatedly criticised for its overall ineffectiveness in creating 
the conditions for autonomous management of matters of relevance to minorities – including 
minority-language education and media – or in enabling NCAs to directly influence policies. Indeed, 
Russia’s NCA system is removed from the original NCA concept, as developed in the late 19
th
 
century, which foresaw full autonomy in the management of institutions for the preservation of 
minority languages and cultures.
21
 Yet dismissing all NCAs as no more than ‘pocket NGOs’ would 
mean dismissing the commitment of many of these organisations’ representatives to preserve their 
cultures and languages, in an environment characterised by a non-democratic tradition of 
centralised decision-making. Interviews with respondents from NCAs revealed that levels of 
motivation, and underlying reasons, for becoming involved with these institutions can greatly vary 
from case to case. These can include: an emotional attachment to one’s ethno-linguistic and cultural 
heritage, and a desire to maintain this distinctiveness; a (more pragmatic) desire to achieve personal 
social (or political) status; and/or a drive to develop networks among state structures, optimising 
                                                           
19
 I have written on this in: Prina, F. National Minorities in Putin’s Russia: Diversity and Assimilation (London: 
Routledge, 2016) – see Chapter 6. See also Zamyatin, K., “From Language Revival to Language Removal? The 
Teaching of Titular Languages in the National Republics of Post-Soviet Russia”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and 
Minority Issues in Europe, 11(2) (2012), 75–102. 
20
 As well as other Central and East European countries that have adopted NCA legislation (Hungary, Serbia and 
Estonia). For Russia, interviews were held in June and October 2015 in Moscow, St Petersburg, Kazan, Saransk. 
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/L007126/1], under 
the project ‘National Minority Rights and Democratic Political Community: Practices of Non-Territorial 
Autonomy in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe’ (2014-2017).  I also draw from interviews conducted 
in 2010-11 in various cities of Russia (Moscow, St Petersburg, Petrozavodsk, Saransk, Kazan, Voronezh and 
Tver); representatives of NCAs constituted one of the categories of respondents. 
21
 Described by Karl Renner in his article State and Nation, published in 1899 (reprinted in E. Nimni, National 
Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics. Abingdon: Routledge, 2005). The concept is based on the 
‘personality principle’, or the idea that communities may be autonomous and sovereign within a multinational 
state, regardless of whether they have, or identify with, a particular territory. 
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chances for funding and other types of support. In some cases one of these factors may prevail, and 
in others several may simultaneously play a role. Thus, persons belonging to minorities cultivate 
their networks and use shifting opportunities with different purposes and in different ways. What 
leaders of NCAs
22
 have in common is the need to operate within the ‘politics of the possible’
23
 to 
reproduce pre-established narratives of inter-ethnic relations, and follow specific (uniform) ‘rules of 
engagement’ in their day-to-day work.  
 
RUSSIA’S UNIFORMITY: HOW MINORITY ISSUES ARE KEPT OUTSIDE POLITICS 
 
The state’s promotion of uniformity across Russian society means that deviation from state-
endorsed socio-political narratives is strongly circumscribed. Attacks on non-uniformity are activated 
not only in case of expression of political dissent (treated as deviant political behaviour), but also in 
other instances, such as: socially ‘unaccepted’ types of diversity (for example, homosexuality as 
‘non-traditional sexual relationships’
24
); and certain forms of ‘accepted’ diversity (such as ethno-
linguistic and religious diversity), which are, however, expressed in non-conventional ways. I first 
describe the promotion of uniformity, and then the way in which the expression of diversity is 
contained.  
 
One of the means to advance uniformity in Russia is by situating minority issues outside political 
processes. Political parties on the basis of ethnicity are banned in Russia,
25
 and considerations linked 
to minority rights do not constitute part of mainstream parties’ political platforms. This scenario 
markedly differs from political systems in which representatives of minorities have reserved seats in 
parliament, and/or guaranteed opportunities to actively participate in law- and policy-making. 
Meanwhile, regional leaders – including leaders of ethnic regions – have generally been absorbed 
                                                           
22
 And generally other institutions representing minorities, such as cultural centres and NGOs. 
23
 This point was noted by an academic in St Petersburg, who used the expression ‘politics of the possible’ 
during an interview held on 29 October 2015.  
24
 Article 5(2)(4) of the federal Law ‘On Protecting Children from Information Harming their Health and 
Development’, No. 436-FP, 29 December 2010 (following amendments introduced by Law No. 135-FZ, 29 June 
2013). 
25
 As well as professional affiliation and religious identity. Article 9(3) of Law ‘On Political Parties’, No. 95-FZ, 11 
July 2001. 
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into the ranks of the party of power, United Russia.
26
 The resulting political uniformity largely 
excludes public debate on matters of relevance to minorities.  
 
As minority issues are distanced from the political sphere, they are equated with ‘cultural 
development’ rather than cultural or political rights. The activities of minority institutions (NCAs and 
others) may be held in cooperation and/or with the financial support of the authorities,
27
 yet they 
have to fit into government-endorsed programmes. Although some variations exist, relevant 
activities have included: the organisation of festivals, concerts, exhibitions and other cultural events; 
the holding of roundtable discussions on issues relating to ethnic diversity; the teaching of minority 
languages (through Sunday schools or in cooperation with state schools); and the publication of 
newspapers in minority languages. Russia’s reports to the Council of Europe, on the implementation 
of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
28
 list numerous festivals and 
roundtables,
29
 as well as ‘programmes of [inter-ethnic] tolerance’.
30
 Multiple groups are brought 
together during such events, particularly through institutions such as Houses of Nationalities, which 
gather representatives of different ethnic groups at the level of various cities, and seek to 
demonstrate the high levels ethno-linguistic and cultural diversity in urban settings.
31
 
 
The separation of the cultural and political spheres, and minorities’ general exclusion from the latter, 
means that involvement in cultural activities is not matched by opportunities for participation in 
devising policies affecting minorities, such as minority-language education. Registering an NCA 
makes it plain that the institution in question will not challenge the socio-political status quo, and 
                                                           
26
 See Isaacs, R. and Whitmore, S. “The Limited Agency and Lifecycles of Personalized Dominant Parties in the 
Post-Soviet Space: The Cases of United Russia and Nur Otan” Democratization  21(4) (2014), 699–721. See also 
Prina, op. cit. (n. 19), at 111-113. 
27 
Of the government funds made available for national minorities’ cultural programmes, some are managed 
by the authorities themselves, while others are given the minority organisations in the form of grants for the 
realisation of events and projects. Russia’s Third Report to the ACFC cites 240 million roubles per year 
(approximately 5.7 million euro) for ‘events for the realisation of the national policy’. ACFC, Third Report 
submitted by the Russian Federation,
 
 ACFC/SR/III(2010)005, 9 April 2010, at 82.   
28
 Ratified by Russia in 1998. 
29
 For example, see ACFC, Third Report submitted by the Russian Federation, op. cit. (n. 27), at
.
 30-43. 
30
 See, for example, “Program for inter-ethnic and inter-cultural relations, prevention of xenophobia and 
strengthening of tolerance in Saint-Petersburg for 2006-2010”, cited in ACFC Third Report submitted by the 
Russian Federation, op. cit. (n. 27), at 84. 
31
 For example, Houses of Nationalities exist in Moscow, St Petersburg and Kazan. 
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that it will operate ‘outside politics’.
32
 The limited participation of minorities in decision-making on 
these matters is exacerbated by the fact that both law and policy on minority rights are largely 
declarative. Again, this is linked to the use of vague expressions such as ‘cultural development’ of 
Russia’s peoples, rather than crystallising specific rights of persons belonging to minorities, and the 
corresponding duties of government bodies in promoting minority rights.  
 
“FOLKLORISATION” INSTEAD OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
 
It is in this context that a report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has 
spoken about the ‘folklorisation’ of minorities in Russia – or minorities’ linguistic and cultural rights 
being treated primarily as folklore.
33
 Folklore and ethnography were already heavily promoted 
during the Soviet period, as depoliticised (and therefore innocuous) ways of celebrating the Soviet 
Union’s diversity. It shows an ongoing attempt to construct a form of diversity that is not 
destabilising, but benign and easily manageable.  
 
Festivals and cultural programmes are certainly not wholly devoid of significance. Rather, many 
respondents
34
 indicated their continuing relevance in the celebration of minorities’ cultural 
distinctiveness, including through traditional songs and performances, and particularly on the 
occasion of traditional national holidays (such as the Tatar Sabantui). Many persons belonging to 
minorities shared a familiarity with cultural/folkloristic events, having become habituated to 
expressing themselves through them. Yet a few representatives of minorities expressed frustration 
at the limited tangible impact of these activities on the preservation of their languages and cultures, 
in the context of – among other things – decreasing numbers of speakers of minority languages.
35
 In 
a country with a ‘core’ dominant culture and language, surrounded by multiple, marginalised 
minority cultures, diversity can only be maintained through robust policies for its promotion.
36
 The 
opposite paves the way for assimilation. 
                                                           
32
 This expression was used by various respondents involved with NCAs and peoples’ congresses (another form 
of ‘non-territorial autonomy’), interviewed in Saransk, Kazan and Moscow, in June and October 2016. 
33 
PACE, “Situation of Finno-Ugric and Samoyed Peoples”, Doc. 11087, 26 October 2006.  
34
 See note 20. 
35
 Among other things, this is linked to restrictions on the autonomy of regions in teaching the languages, 
cultures and history of minorities, through the federal reform of the education system referred to above. 
36
 Such as well-planned and effective language policies promoting minority languages. See, for example, Grin, 
F. and Moring, T.. Support for Minority Languages in Europe: Final Report (European Bureau for Lesser-Used 
Languages/European Centre for Minority Issues, 2002). 
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The narrative of minority-rights-as-cultural-development is linked to the strengthening of Russian 
patriotism, and the promotion of values aiming at enhancing the cohesiveness of the Russian state. 
Such values comprise: love of the motherland; family values; the assertion of Russia’s sovereignty 
and its great power status vis-à-vis the West; and, more recently, Crimea being part of Russia. Love 
for the motherland, in particular, is linked to the need to defend Russia from its enemies; in this 
context the 70
th
 anniversary of Russia’s victory in the Second World War (known in Russia as the 
‘Great Patriotic War’) was celebrated in 2015 with much fanfare and military parades, used to solicit 
patriotic pride. Most of the said values are placed in the context of religiosity, as ‘spiritual values’ 
promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church (for the Russian majority) and other (government-
endorsed) religious institutions.
37
  
It is significant that textbooks for the course ‘Foundations of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics’, 
introduced in the 2000s, are saturated with these values and principles. Schools and parents can 
choose between six modules of the course, for different religions (Orthodox Christianity, Islam, 
Judaism and Buddhism), as well as the general ‘Foundations of the Cultures of World Religions’, and 
the course’s secular version (‘Foundations of Secular Ethics’).
38
 Despite the differences in modules, 
the principles found in textbooks are the same and closely associated to Russian patriotism. Spiritual 
and civic values are then disseminated though the education system, and include a patriotic but also 
a militaristic rhetoric (through the emphasis on the need to defend the motherland).
39
 
 
HOW DIFFERENCES BECOME REDEFINED AS “EXTREMISM” 
 
With the promotion of uniformity, restrictions are imposed on various manifestations of the 
expression of diversity. These restrictions are linked to the idea of a potential menace to stability 
caused by ethnic diversity. This is evident, for example, in a statement by M.N. Kuz’min,
40
 that 
                                                           
37
 For example, the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate, headed by the Chief Mufti of Russia. 
38
 See Willems, J. “Foundations of Orthodox Culture’ in Russia: Confessional or Non-confessional Religious 
Education?” European Education, 44(2) (2012), 23–43. 
39
 Sperling, V. “Making the Public Patriotic: Militarism and Anti-Militarism in Russia”, in: M. Laruelle (ed.), 
Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 218-271. 
40
 Former Director of the Institute of Nationality Issues in Education of the Ministry of Education and Science. 
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‘[c]ompared to mono-ethnic countries, multi-ethnicity predestines a country to less stability, to the 
presence of additional areas of inner contradictions’.
41
  
 
This menace is not exclusively seen to originate from direct inter-ethnic tensions or open political 
dissent, but also from particular expressions of difference regarded as deviation from accepted 
norms of inter-ethnic relations. The dominant, state-sponsored narrative is one that declares the 
peaceful coexistence of Russia’s ethno-linguistic groups, but contrasts this with the position of those 
who espouse extremist views – in a black-and-white discourse of ‘tolerance’ versus ‘extremism’. The 
tolerance-extremism divide leads to the practice of automatically linking ‘different’ (non-
conventional) representatives of ethnic groups to extremism, rather than assessing whether they 
indeed represent a threat to public order. For example, when post-Soviet Tatarstan attempted to re-
introduce the Latin alphabet for Tatar – the conversion to the Cyrillic having being imposed under 
Stalin – those who advocated the return of the Latin alphabet were accused of separatism and 
labelled a ‘threat to national security’.
42
  The Latin alphabet was treated as outside the existing 
narratives of diversity – and as such able to trigger disunity and political turmoil.  
Thus, difference is routinely associated to instability, while uniformity and ‘sameness’ are linked to 
public order. The concept of ‘extremism’ used by the Russian leadership is elastic, and it can stretch 
to accommodate its discourses and objectives. These are linked to both Russia’s internal and foreign 
policy (the state’s core interests), but also attacks on government-sponsored values are 
impermissible: deriding or challenging them is treated as a lack of respect for such principles. In one 
case, a Tatar nationalist was found guilty of incitement for ethnic hatred (and separatism) for 
condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
43
 The members of the Pussy Riot protest group, who 
performed an anti-Putin song in a cathedral in Moscow in 2012, were charged of incitement of 
                                                           
41
 Kuz’min, M.N. “K Voprosu o Razrabotke Kontseptsii Federal’noi Etnonatsional’noi Obrazovatel’noi Politiki 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [On Compiling a Concept of Federal Ethnonational Educational Policy of the Russian 
Federation], in: Materials of the Conference ‘Realisation of the National Regional Component of History 
Education in the National Republics of the Volga and Ural Regions: Problems and Perspectives’, 26 October 
2004 (Kazan: Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, 2005), 14–24, at 16. 
42 
For example, in a report presented before the Russian parliament, cited in
 
Saiganova, S. “Turki Royut pod 
Russiyu cherez Tatarstan” [Turks Get into Russia through Tatarstan], Vremya i Den’gi, 8 February 2001.
. 
 
43
 See, for example, “Tatar Activist Get Three Years in Jail for Stance on Crimea”, RFE/RL, 15 September 2015, 
at: http://www.rferl.org/content/tatarstan-crimea-activist-prison/27249218.html  
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religious hatred.
44
 Charges of incitement to ethnic hatred have also been brought against unusual 
suspects, such as: the director of Moscow’s Library of Ukrainian Literature, for spreading ‘anti-
Russian propaganda’;
45
 and an (ethnic) Russian shop assistant, for sharing links to mainstream 
Ukrainian television programmes on the Ukrainian crisis through social networks.
46
 Moreover, the 
Russian authorities have for years added to a list of banned extremist materials which are associated 
with subversion even when they do not seem to pose a threat to public order; according to data by 
Sova, in the first half of 2015 the list grew twice the 2014 rate.
47
 Restrictions have further applied to 
artistic expression: non-conventional treatment of religious themes in art has been linked to 
‘incitement to religious hatred’.
48
 A powerful symbol of Russia’s ‘great power status’, and of its 
different ethnic groups uniting to fight Russia’s enemies, remains the ‘Great Patriotic War’: as such, 
some measures have restricted historical debate that can demystify the perception of the Russian 
army, revealing its veterans as less than heroes.
49
  
                                                           
44
 They were however not found guilty of incitement, but hooliganism, and sentenced to imprisonment for two 
years. Although they were ultimately amnestied, this was only three months before they served the full 
sentence.  
45
 Natalia Sharina. See “Russia: Librarian Locked up. Ukrainian Library’s Director Accused of ‘Inciting Hatred’”, 
Human Rights Watch, 30 October 2015,  https://www.hrw.org/el/node/282848  
46
 Yekaterina Vologzheninova. See, for example, A. Dolgov. “Russian Woman Says Charged With ‘Inciting Ethnic 
Hatred’ for Posts on Ukraine Crisis”, The Moscow Times, 5 January 2015, at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-woman-says-charged-with-inciting-ethnic-hatred-for-
posts-on-ukraine-crisis/514044.html; The woman, who was an ethnic Russian but wrote some posts in 
Ukrainian - having learned the language - was investigated for membership of Ukrainian nationalist groups. 
47
 The list grew by 305 items (from 2562 to 2867) in the first six months of 2015. Sova Center for Information 
and Analysis (see note 7).  
48
 See, for example, “Russians Convicted and Fined over Forbidden Art Show”, BBC, 6 March 2012, at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/10595903; see also Jonson, L. Art and Protest in Putin’s Russia (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2015). 
49
 For example, a book that included information on the rape of German women by Soviet soldiers during the 
fall of Berlin in 1945 was banned from schools in Yekaterinburg region. See Walker, S. “Russian Region Bans 
British Historians' Books from Schools”, The Guardian, 5 August 2015, at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/05/russian-region-bans-british-historians-books-from-
schools#img-1 .  
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Russia might be in search of narratives and values that can promote a sense of stability (and 
normality) in politically-challenging times.
50
 At the same time, these attitudes support the view that 
‘raw’ difference, as unfiltered by homogenising government-supported narratives, can be harmful. 
Uniformising tendencies also lead to national minorities being conceived as having hardly any 
internal heterogeneity. In this context, the NCA system reveals an assumption of homogeneity 
within groups, whose messages and goals can be easily streamlined – from the local, to the regional, 
to the federal level. The NCA system admits no internal fractures, or dissenting elements located 
within the group. Meanwhile, the focus on folklore (referred to above) further contributes to the 
idea of internally homogeneous groups, by ascribing specific (often folkloristic) traits to them. The 
existing scenario can be described in the shape of two concentric circles: an ethnic group that is 
internally homogeneous (the inner circle), with its ‘diversity’ adjusting to a broader patriotic 
uniformity (the outer circle).  
 
Those labelled as ‘extremists’ – in the case of both those who disrupt public order and those who 
simply express dissent or unconventional forms of diversity – are presented as a few aberrations, 
against which the state must protect its (overall tolerant) citizens. While the perpetrators of hate 
crime have been prosecuted,
51
 the state effectively closes its eyes on widespread racism and 
discrimination in Russian society.
52
 And, while the day-to-day manifestations of racism might be 
more ‘banal’ than the actions of ‘extremists’ – e.g. discrimination in housing and employment rather 
than episodes of hate crime – racist views are not the preserve of the few.
53
 Discriminatory views 
and stereotypes often remain unchallenged, which raises the question as to whether ongoing 
strategies of diversity management are indeed conducive to societal cohesion, in the presence of 
racist attitudes (particularly vis-à-vis migrant workers), and chauvinism (especially with regard to the 
annexation of Crimea). The Crimean question, in particular, can easily create fractures within 
                                                           
50
 Laruelle, M. “Rethinking Russian Nationalism: Historical Continuity, Political Diversity, and Doctrinal 
Fragmentation”, in: M. Laruelle (ed.), Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009), 13-48, at 26. 
51
 Sova Center for Information and Analysis (see note 7). 
52
 Osipov, A. “Soviet Party of Nations or Western Non-Discrimination: Is there a Dilemma for Russia?” in: K. 
Cordell, T. Agarin and A. Osipov (eds.), Institutional Legacies of Communism: Change and Continuities in 
Minority Protection (London & New York: Routledge, 2013), 59–73, at 66-67; see also the introduction on this.                                                                                           
53
 See for example, Verkhovsky, A. “Future Prospects of Contemporary Russian Nationalism”, in: M. 
Laruelle (ed.), Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 89–
103. 
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Russia’s society, when some groups (such as the Ukrainians residing in Russia) are aligned with 
Russia’s enemies.  
 
Finally, in addition to celebrating minority cultures, festivals carry additional messages, on friendly 
inter-ethnic relations, patriotism, and forms of (controlled) collective memory such as the ‘Great 
Patriotic War’. But not only: they attempt to solicit general support of the state and the ruling party: 
thus, for example, United Russia flags can often be seen at festivals. Some respondents referred to 
festivals that promoted (mainstream) political figures, by providing additional exposure of 
incumbents, who strategically took part in these events prior to local or regional elections. These 
practices might be accepted by some persons belonging to minorities as the ‘price to pay’ to benefit 
from cultural programmes, which would otherwise remain unavailable to them. Yet they can lead to 
the state appropriating narratives and activities around cultural diversity, prioritising its interests to 
those of minorities. Moreover, through festivals the state can showcase narratives of a multi-ethnic 
country without however introducing wide-ranging anti-discrimination policies protecting minorities, 
or proactively promoting cultural diversity and multilingualism. 
 
Consequently, representatives of national minorities often fall into a uniformity trap – whether 
wholly or partially, consciously or unconsciously, willingly or reluctantly, for opportunistic reasons or 
ultimately to promote minority interests. Like other civil society groups, they reproduce existing 
discourses, in order to gain funding, networks, and other opportunities. Those who go against these 
rules of engagement can hit invisible boundaries: thus, forms of ethno-cultural expression that may 
transcend the expression of culture per se, crossing into the political sphere, are generally avoided 
as counterproductive. Activities that deviate from existing, tried-and-tested blueprints – even when 
exclusively in the area of culture or education – can be denied support by the authorities.
54
 Although 
the responses of the authorities partially varied depending on locality (and individual public 
officials), Russia’s programmes of tolerance seem to display an intolerance to difference.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Russia continues to have considerable ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious diversity, with some 
persons belonging to national minorities striving to preserve their cultural distinctiveness. At the 
                                                           
54
 This was noted by some respondents who had sought to propose new activities, such as scholarships for 
young members of ethnic communities, exchange programmes, and supports for museums. The respondents 
stressed the authorities’ predilection for multi-ethnic festivals.  
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same time, Russian society is becoming more culturally and linguistically homogenised, as well as 
politically uniform. The means available to national minorities to assert themselves and promote 
their rights remain outside political processes, while the expression of peaceful dissent – whether 
political or otherwise – is generally curbed by state organs. This leads to a culture-dominated 
minority discourse, with institutions such as NCAs primarily acting as cultural centres devoid of 
political voice.  
 
Effectively the Russian government under Putin is attempting to cement separate social segments 
(cutting alongside ethnicity, religion and geography) through a form of homogenising patriotism. 
Intolerance to difference (including certain types of expression of what is, overall, ‘accepted’ 
difference) is detectable even in the presence of so-called ‘programmes of tolerance’ so frequently 
promoted by the Russian state. Meanwhile, minorities act within the realm of ‘the possible’, by 
adjusting to dominant narratives of (restricted) diversity. Groups are perceived as internally uniform 
and essentialised; they, in turn, fit into the broader patriotic view of Russia and adjust to centrally-
conceived narratives and policies – themselves fused with religious or quasi-religious narratives. If 
Russia is moving towards increased uniformity with regard to its ethnicity-based territorial 
formations, this is even more so with regard to non-territorial arrangements for diversity 
management, whose legislation and policies remain generally declarative. National cultural 
autonomy could contribute to counteracting such homogenising dynamics, if the relevant 
institutions were indeed guaranteed greater autonomy in managing matters relating to the 
preservation of their languages and cultures. 
 
While overarching civic values are essential for state cohesiveness, an excessive focus on uniformity 
can advance cultural absorption, and ultimately assimilation. Paradoxically, what outwardly looks 
like the expression of diversity becomes the promotion of uniformity – both in the sense of cultural 
uniformity, and in the impelling need to adjust to particular modalities of state-minorities 
interaction. 
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